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after death are taxable to the recipient in the same manner as
the decedent would have reported the payments had the
decedent survived.17
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law chs. 47, 48
(1993); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual §§ 6.02–6.05
(1993).
2 See 6 Harl, Agricultural Law § 48.03.
3 Id., ch 49.
4 Id., § 6.05.
5 Est. of Bell v. Comm’r, 60 T.C. 469 (1973); 212 Corp. v.
Comm’r, 70 T.C. 788 (1978).
6 See Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357, 359
(3d Cir. 1949); Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Stern v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1992-374 (gain on transfers of
stock to foreign trust in exchange for private annuity
deferrable).
7 See n. 5 supra.
8 I.R.C. § 1038.
9 I.R.C. § 1038(b)(2).
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.1038-1(a)(1).
11 See Ltr. Rul. 8736026, June 5, 1987 (Section 1038
applied to repossession of farmland by seller through
forfeiture of installment sales contract after several
modifications of payment terms).
12 I.R.C. § 1038(b)(2).
13 See n. 5 supra.
14 See Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.
15 Est. of Frane v. Comm’r, 98 T.C. 341 (1992), aff'd and
rev'd, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1993) (cancellation of
installment note treated as disposition).
16 I.R.C. §§ 691(a)(4), 453B(c).
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.691(a)-5. See Claiborne v. U.S., 648 F.2d
448 (6th Cir. 1981) (closing of land transaction after
owner's death); Ltr. Rul. 9023012, March 6, 1990 (land
contract cancellable if mortgage commitment not
obtained within 45 days and decedent died within 45 day
period; mortgage commitment not obtained but parties
proceeded to closing and gain was income in respect of
decedent); Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross, 262 F. Supp.
900 (N.D. Ga. 1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); Hedrick v. Comm’r,
63 T.C. 395 (1974).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKING
CHECKS. The plaintiff sold cattle to a cattle market
agency which resold the cattle to third parties. The agency
used an account with the defendant bank to issue checks for
these purchases, often with insufficient funds in the account
and with the defendant’s knowledge and acceptance that
payment for the checks would be deposited several days
later. The agency had made a purchase of cattle from the
plaintiff and had issued a check when sufficient funds were
in the account. However, the defendant received a return of
a prior deposit for insufficient funds, leaving a negative
balance in the agency account. When the payment from the
agency’s later sale of the cattle arrived at the bank, the bank
offset the deposit against the negative balance, closed the
account and returned the agency’s check to the plaintiff for
insufficient funds. The plaintiff argued that the bank had
knowledge that the agency was a cattle broker and that the
deposit from the buyer was probably meant to be used by
the agency to pay the check issued to the plaintiff for the
same cattle. The court held that the bank had a duty to
inquire as to the nature of the deposit before setting it off
against prior charges against the agency’s account.
Blackwell Livestock v. Community Bank, 864 P.2d 1297
(Okla. Ct. App. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor’s Chapter 12 case
was converted to Chapter 7 for fraud by the debtors. A
creditor held a judgment lien against the debtors’ farm
which exceeded the debtors’ equity in the farm after a
mortgage and the debtors admitted that they had no equity
in the farm. The court held that the automatic stay would be
lifted as to the judgment creditor because the debtors had no
equity in the farm and the farm would not be part of any
reorganization. In re Kingsley, 161 B.R. 995 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1994).
The debtor was an S corporation in Chapter 11 with a
confirmed plan. A bank obtained a judgment in state court
against a 25 percent shareholder in the corporation and
sought relief from the automatic stay to execute the
judgment against the shareholder’s stock. The corporation
had incurred substantial tax losses which were passed
through to the shareholder but the losses were not currently
deductible because the shareholder did not have sufficient
stock basis to claim the deductions. The suspended losses
were held to be estate property to the extent the corporation
benefited from not having to make distributions to the
shareholder to pay taxes on any pass-through income. The
corporation, therefore, resisted the bank’s motion because
the sale of the stock to a third party would cause the loss of
the suspended tax losses since the losses were personal to
the shareholder. The corporation also argued that the sale of
the stock to an individual or entity not eligible to be an S
corporation shareholder could cause the complete loss of the
suspended tax losses. The court noted that the stock was
subject to restrictions which prevented sale to an ineligible
shareholder and which prevented sales except upon the
consent of the other shareholders and subject to a right of
first refusal of the other shareholders and the corporation.
The court held that the bank was adequately protected
because the reorganization of the corporation would likely
result in a substantial increase in the book value of the
stock. The court held that the bank would be granted relief
from the automatic stay because the relief would not injure
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the corporation since the stock sale restrictions would
prevent loss of the tax loss benefits or the S corporation
status. The court noted that the corporation had sufficient
resources to either purchase the stock and resell it to the
shareholder or to loan the purchase price to the shareholder.
In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 162 B.R. 62 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor was a wholesale
dealer in food products who had purchased but not paid for
dairy and food products from a producer. One month after
the debtor filed for Chapter 11, the producer filed a
beneficiary’s notice of intent under Minn. Stat. § 27.138 to
preserve trust assets for the amount owed. The producer
sought recovery of the trust assets from the bankruptcy
estate as not included in bankruptcy estate property. The
court held that the statute did not create a trust because none
of the traditional indicia of a trust existed, such as (1) a
trustee, (2) fiduciary duties, and (3) restrictions on use of
trust assets. Because the statute created no separate corpus,
allowed trust assets to be commingled with the purchaser’s
other assets, and created no fiduciary duty on the purchaser,
no trust indicia were present. Instead, the court held that the
statute created only a security interest which was perfected
upon filing of the beneficiary’s notice of intent to preserve
trust assets. Because the producer did not file the notice
until after the petition, the security interest was unperfected
and avoidable by the trustee. In addition, the court noted
that the statute allowed the purchaser to sell the “trust”
assets free of the security interest in several instances;
therefore, the trustee as a bona fide purchaser, took
possession of the assets free of the security interest. Query:
The Minnesota statute is obviously patterned after the trust
provided in the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act
and the Packers and Stockyards Act, both of which are
recognized in bankruptcy as creating a trust without the trust
indicia required by the court. Why was the state “trust”
treated differently? Why were the PACA and PSA trust
parallels not discussed? The court described the statute as a
“thinly disguised attempt to give one class of unsecured
creditors an advantage over other unsecured creditors.” Is
this not a state’s prerogative, often accepted in other areas?
In re Country Club Market, Inc., 162 B.R. 226 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1993).
CLAIMS. During the Chapter 11 portion of the case, a
creditor filed a request for payment of administrative
expenses resulting from loans to the debtor-in-possession.
The request was denied. The case was converted to Chapter
7 and the creditor did not file a claim for the Chapter 11
loans until more than two years after the conversion. The
creditor argued that the Chapter 11 request for
administrative expenses should be deemed a filing of a
claim in the Chapter 7 case. The court held that the creditor
was required to file a timely claim after the conversion and
denied the claim as untimely. Matter of De Vries Grain &
Fertilizer, Inc., 12 F.3d 101 (7th Cir. 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtors had leased dairy cows from
the creditor under contract. Over the several years of the
contract relationship, the parties kept informal and often
inaccurate account of the number of cows under the lease.
The creditor terminated the lease and recovered most of the
cows and sued for damages for the missing cows. A state
court judgment awarded the creditor damages and the debtor
filed for bankruptcy. The creditor sought to have the
judgment declared nondischargeable under Sections
523(a)(4), (6). The court held that the debt was
dischargeable because (1) the lease did not give rise to a
fiduciary relationship as required by Section 523(a)(4) and
(2) the loss of the cows, while a breach of contract, was
more the result of sloppy accounting over the years by both
parties than embezzlement or larceny as required by Section
523(a)(6). In re Hoffman, 161 B.R. 998 (D. N.D. 1993),
aff’g, 144 B.R. 459 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1992).
In an attempt to avoid foreclosure of their farm, the
debtors filed several Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases and
various law suits. The instant case involved the final
Chapter 12 case in which the debtors failed to list the
debtors’ interest in inherited property and a transfer of some
of the inherited property to third parties for no
consideration. In an earlier ruling, the court had ordered the
case converted to Chapter 7 because of the debtors’ fraud in
failing to report assets and the gratuitous transfer. A creditor
filed an objection to the debtors’ discharge under Section
727(a)(4)(A) and argued that the ruling converting the case
to Chapter 7 must be given collateral estoppel effect to deny
the debtors’ discharge. The court held that its ruling on
converting the case to Chapter 7 for fraud satisfied the
requirements of collateral estoppel to deny the debtors’
discharge for fraud. In re Kingsley, 162 B.R. 249 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1994).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought to avoid two
judicial liens which impaired the debtor’s homestead
exemption. Because the liens were less than the exemption
amount, all of the liens impaired the exemption. The court
had ruled in In re D’Amelio, 142 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1992), that impairing liens were not avoided but only placed
in a junior priority as to the debtor’s exemption rights,
where the liens did not fully impair the exemption. The
court altered the rule in this case and held that an impairing
lien was avoided to the extent the lien impaired the
exemption. Because the liens were less than the debtor’s
exemption, the liens were completely avoided. In re Garbo,
161 B.R. 869 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
IRA. The debtor claimed an interest in an IRA as either
not estate property or as exempt property under Ga. Code §
44-13-100(a)(2)(E). The debtor was 63 years old and had
not begun receiving payments from the IRA. The court held
that the IRA was estate property because the IRA contained
only penalties for withdrawals and not restrictions on the
use of the funds. The court also held that the IRA was not
exempt because the exemption applied only to periodic
payments from a retirement plan and the debtor was not
receiving any payments. In re Meehan, 162 B.R. 367
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993).
PENSION PLAN. The debtor’s property included an
interest in an employee contribution retirement plan
qualified under ERISA. The court held that the debtor’s
interest in the plan was not estate property because the
interest was a trust interest restricted by applicable
nonbankruptcy law. In re Rueter, 11 F.3d 850 (9th Cir.
1993).
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    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
ATTORNEY’S FEES. When the debtors defaulted on
their plan payments on claims secured by their farm land,
the debtors arranged with the secured creditor to sell the
land. The debtors’ bankruptcy attorney provided legal
services for the sales and although the amount of the fees
was not at issue, the attorney argued that the payment of the
legal fees should be made from the proceeds of the land
sales under Section 506(c) because the creditor benefitted
from the sales. The attorney argued that the creditor
benefitted because the creditor received more under the
separate sales than it would have under a foreclosure sale of
the entire property. The court held that the attorney’s
services were merely part of the debtors’ attempt to
reorganize and primarily benefitted the debtors in that the
debtors were able to complete the plan and retain their
homestead; therefore, the attorney’s fees were an
administrative expense payable from the debtors’ estate. In
re Hiddleston, 162 B.R. 13 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
PLAN. A bank had four liens against the property of the
debtor. The first lien was secured solely by farm equipment.
The second and third liens were secured by a variety of farm
equipment, livestock, accounts receivable and crops through
cross-collateralization with a single security agreement. The
fourth lien was secured by real property. The debtors’ plan,
however, identified specific property as collateral for the
second and third liens and did not refer to the cross-
collateralization of the liens. The debtors sought discharge
after making all plan payments and sought release from the
banks’ liens. The bank argued that the liens should remain
in effect because they were cross-collateralized. The court
held that the bank was bound by the terms of the confirmed
plan which identified specific collateral for each lien. In re
Lyon, 161 B.R. 1013 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The IRS had filed timely claims for federal
taxes owed by the debtor for 1973, 1974 and 1976 and had
filed amended claims for those years. However, because of
computer problems, the IRS filed an untimely claim for
taxes owed for 1989 and sought approval of the claim as an
amendment of the timely filed claims. The IRS argued that
the debtor was on notice that more claims could be filed for
other years. The court held that a claim for taxes for one
taxable year was not allowed as an amendment of a claim
for a different taxable year and disallowed the claim.
Matter of Appling, 162 B.R. 43 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1993).
DEDUCTIONS. The Chapter 7 trustee filed corporate
income tax returns for the debtor corporation which reported
income and expenses on the accrual method of accounting.
The trustee filed amended returns deducting expenses for
accrued post-petition interest on general unsecured claims
filed in the case. The corporation was insolvent throughout
the bankruptcy case. The IRS denied the deductions.  Under
I.R.C. § 461, an interest deduction would not be deductible
under the accrual method of accounting until the taxpayer
became liable “in all events” for the expense. The court held
that the estate would not be liable “in all events” for the
post-petition interest until the estate had paid all unsecured
claims and had property remaining to pay the interest.
During the taxable years of the bankruptcy case, the debtor
was insolvent so that no property would remain after
payment of all unsecured creditors; therefore, the interest
claims did not accrue during the bankruptcy case. In re
West Texas Marketing Corp., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,053 (N.D. Tex. 19943), aff’g, 155 B.R. 399 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1993).
SETOFF. For the several years prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtor had years of underpayment and years
of overpayment of federal taxes. The debtor argued that the
overpayments and underpayments and the interest thereon
should have been calculated separately for each category,
with the totals offset as of the date of the petition. The IRS
argued, and the court held, that because the overpayments
never exceeded the underpayments, no interest would
accrue to the debtor on the overpayments and that the
overpayments were offset against the underpayments as the
overpayments occurred. In re Pettibone Corp., 161 B.R.
960 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’g, 151 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1993).
TAX LIENS. The IRS had filed a tax lien against
property owned by a corporation. The corporation filed for
bankruptcy and the plan provided for the sale of the
property to the debtor in the instant case. The IRS had
notice of the plan and sale but did not object. The IRS did
not refile the lien as to the purchaser and when the purchaser
also filed for bankruptcy, the IRS failed to file a timely
claim for the lien. The court held that because the property
subject to the lien was sold, the tax lien became unperfected
and was subject to avoidance in the purchaser’s bankruptcy
case. U.S. v. LMS Holding Co., 161 B.R. 1020 (N.D.
Okla. 1993), aff’g, 149 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
AGRICULTURAL LABOR-ALM § 3.02.*  The
plaintiffs were migrant seasonal agricultural workers
employed by the defendant family farmer. The plaintiffs
alleged several violations of the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Protection Act and the defendant
argued that the defendant was exempt from the Act under
the family business exemption. The defendant had hired
some of the workers by notifying the state employment
agency of the defendant’s need for seasonal workers. The
state agency charged no fee and supplied the names of
potential workers who were interviewed and hired directly
by the defendant. The plaintiffs argued that the defendant
was not eligible for the exemption because the defendant
used a non-related party to recruit seasonal agricultural
labor. The defendant argued that the state employment
agency was not a contractor because it charged no fee and
did not do the hiring. The court held that under the plain
language of the exemption, the state employment agency
was a recruiter of agricultural labor; therefore, the defendant
was not eligible for the exemption. Martinez v. Hauch, 838
F. Supp. 1209 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
HERBICIDES-ALM § 2.04.*  The plaintiff applied a
herbicide on a non-virus resistant corn crop to control
Johnsongrass; however, the corn had become infected with a
virus transmitted by aphids on the Johnsongrass and
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suffered substantial damage. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer of the herbicide in strict liability, alleging that
the herbicide was inherently dangerous for use on non-virus
resistant corn and that the defendant failed to warn about
that danger. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant
breached the warranty of fitness for a specific purpose and
was negligent in testing the product. The court held that the
action for failure to warn was pre-empted by FIFRA. The
court also dismissed the breach of warranty and negligence
claims because the plaintiff failed to allege any causal
connection between the herbicide and the cause of the
damage to the crop, since the damage was caused by aphids
and a transmitted virus and the defendant’s product only
controlled weeds. Kinser v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 837 F.
Supp. 217 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION. The FSIS
has issued proposed regulations requiring written appeals
above the circuit supervisor level of decisions relating to the
disposition of meat and poultry products. The amendments
also set a 20 day limit for the appeal of or compliance with a
decision. 59 Fed. Reg. 6929 (Feb. 14, 1994).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMOD-
ITIES ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].  A produce seller sold
produce to the debtor under a written agreement that
payment was due within 30 days after invoice.  However,
because the Bankruptcy Court found that the parties in
practice ignored the payment term provision, the court held
that the produce seller had failed to comply with the PACA
trust fund requirements. On appeal, the District Court held
that the payment terms in the written agreement controlled
and that the course of dealing between the parties did not
affect the produce seller’s eligibility for the PACA trust
fund. The produce seller later purchased produce stalls from
the buyer in partial satisfaction of past due accounts and
leased the stalls back to the buyer, giving the buyer an
option to repurchase some of the stalls if the past due
amounts were paid.  The court held that this arrangement
gave the seller equity securing the produce sold after the
transfer and the seller did not have rights in the PACA trust
funds after the transfer.  In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce
Co., 12 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 150 B.R. 941 (E.D.
Mo. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 107 B.R. 952
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989).
TOBACCO. The ASCS has adopted as final regulations
establishing the 1994 marketing quota for flue-cured
tobacco as 802.6 million pounds and the 1994 price support
level at 158.3 cents per pound. 59 Fed. Reg. 6865 (Feb. 14,
1994).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will provided for passing of the residuary estate
to a trust with several beneficiaries, including a foundation
which qualified under I.R.C. § 170(c). The foundation’s
governing agreement limited its activities to the purposes
stated in I.R.C. § 2055. The IRS cited Rev. Rul. 76-307,
1976-2 C.B. 56 for the rule that a gift or estate tax charitable
deduction would be allowed only where gifts are made to
organizations described in both I.R.C. § 170(c) and § 2055
since the sections do not list the same qualifying purposes
for eligible organizations. The IRS ruled that because the
foundation purposes were identical to the qualifying
purposes of Section 2055, the bequests to the foundation
were eligible for the charitable deduction. Ltr. Rul.
9404002, April 23, 1993.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01.*  Over four taxable years, the donor
executed and recorded deeds transferring five parcels of
farm land to the donor's son.  The donor had signed
affidavits characterizing the transfers as gifts and presented
no evidence of consideration from the son for the transfers.
The taxpayer also argued that the taxpayer did not hold title
to the property because the taxpayer received the property
under an improper 1953 probate settlement.  The court held
that the taxpayer was estopped from denying the validity of
the settlement and that the transfers were gifts.  Warda v.
Comm'r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,154 (6th Cir.
1994), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-43.
GIFT SPLITTING-ALM § 6.01.* One month before
the death of the decedent and when the decedent and
surviving spouse knew that the decedent’s death was
imminent, the surviving spouse transferred property in trust
to the decedent with the remainder to descendants, including
skip persons. The surviving spouse as executor filed a gift
tax return, electing to treat the gift of the remainder interests
as split between the spouse and decedent so that the gift
would be eligible for use of the decedent’s GSST exemption
amount. The IRS ruled that because the gift tax return was
the first return for the gift, the executor could elect to treat
the gift as split, with the decedent’s share of the gift eligible
for the decedent’s GSST exemption. The IRS also ruled that
the value of the decedent’s interest in the trust was the fair
market value of the property because the transfer was made
when the parties knew that the decedent’s death was
imminent. Ltr. Rul. 9404023, Nov. 1, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent bequeathed property in trust to the surviving
spouse but the will provided that if the executor did not elect
QTIP treatment for the trust, the trust assets would pass to a
trust for the decedent's children. The Tax Court held that the
trust was not eligible for the marital deduction because the
executor had the power to defeat the surviving spouse's
interest in the trust. The appellate court reversed, adopting
the holding of Est. of Clayton v. Comm’r, 976 F.2d 1486
(5th Cir. 1992), that by definition QTIP property was
property for which an election was made; therefore, the
power of the executor to not make the election did not affect
the property’s eligibility for QTIP treatment. Est. of
Robertson v. Comm'r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,153 (8th Cir. 1994), rev’g, 98 T.C. 678 (1992).
The decedent’s estate passed to an intervivos revocable
trust which became irrevocable upon the decedent’s death.
The intervivos trust already owned the decedent’s ranch
land. At the decedent’s death, the trust split into two trusts, a
marital trust to be funded with sufficient property to
decrease the decedent’s estate tax to zero after the unified
credit. The remaining assets passed to a residuary trust. Both
trusts had the surviving spouse as lifetime income
beneficiary. The residuary trust had a remainder bequest
which provided, on the death of the surviving spouse, for a
pecuniary bequest to heirs and a charity. The surviving
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spouse disclaimed any interest in a life insurance policy on
the surviving spouse’s life which was transferred to the
residuary trust from the decedent’s estate. The trustee then
borrowed sufficient funds against the policy to make the
pecuniary bequests. The estate elected special use valuation
for the ranch land. The IRS ruled that the special use value
of the ranch land in the marital trust was to be used to
calculate the marital deduction. The IRS also ruled that the
pecuniary bequest to the charity did not affect the special
use valuation election because sufficient non-special use
property was included in the estate to make the bequests.
Ltr. Rul. 9407015, Nov. 18, 1993.
VALUATION. The taxpayers transferred 20 shares of
stock in their wholly-owned corporation to five grantor
retained income trusts. The stock was valued at $9,639 and
had paid dividends of $13 per share over the prior three
years, a yield of 0.2 percent. The trustee was prohibited
from selling the stock. The taxpayers valued the retained
income interests using the actuarial tables in Treas. Reg. §
20.2512-5(f) for a value of $100,000. The IRS argued that
the low dividends and prohibition against the trustee's
selling the stock to acquire more productive property barred
any value to the income interests. The appellate court held
that both valuation methods were unreasonable and
remanded the case to the Tax Court for a determination of
the value of the retained income interests for gift tax
purposes. The Tax Court held that the IRS valuation method
was appropriate because it provided some value for the
income interests and accounted for the history of small
dividends and the high retained earnings. O'Reilly v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1994-61, on rem. from, 973 F.2d
1403 (8th Cir. 1992).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer had brought a state court action for
misrepresentation and breach of contract by the purchaser of
the taxpayer’s business. The parties settled with a payment
to the taxpayer. The court held that the damages allocable to
the misrepresentation claim were excludible from taxable
income as tort damages, but that the breach of contract
damages were not excludible. Fitts v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-52.
ESTIMATED TAX. The IRS has issued new Form
8342, Election to Use Different Annualization Period for
Corporate Estimated Tax, which includes the changes for
annualization periods enacted under RRA 1993, Section
13225. Ann. 94-35, I.R.B. 1994-9.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayers exchanged
residential rental property for mountain vacation rental
property. The other owner assumed a portion of the
mortgage on the residential property in consideration for the
exchange and several of the taxpayers’ expenses not related
to the exchange were paid from the escrow account. The
court ruled that the taxpayers realized gain from boot from
the exchange to the extent of the mortgage assumption and
non-exchange related expenses paid. Blatt v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1994-48.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS had
filed a Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA)
with the designated tax matters partner (TMP) of the
taxpayer limited partnership. The TMP, however, orally
resigned as TMP and one of the limited partners was orally
designated TMP. The new TMP filed a petition in the Tax
Court objecting to the FPAA within 90 days after the FPAA
was issued. The court held that the petition was not properly
filed because the limited partner could not be a TMP. The
court upheld the Tax Court’s refusal to retroactively name a
TMP so that the case could continue. Tranpac Drilling
Venture v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,067 (Fed.
Cir. 1994), aff’g, 26 Cls. Ct. 1245 (1992).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
March 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 4.01 3.97 3.95 3.94
110% AFR 4.42 4.37 4.35 4.33
120% AFR 4.82 4.76 4.73 4.71
Mid-term
AFR 5.36 5.29 5.26 5.23
110% AFR 5.90 5.82 5.78 5.75
120% AFR 6.45 6.35 6.30 6.27
Long-term
AFR 6.35 6.25 6.20 6.17
110% AFR 7.00 6.88 6.82 6.78
120% AFR 7.64 7.50 7.43 7.39
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. The IRS has issued
procedures for automatic waiver of inadvertent termination
of an S corporation election resulting from failure of a
QSST to make the election under I.R.C. § 1361(d)(2).  The
automatic relief is available only if the failure to file the
election was inadvertent, the shareholders filed their tax
returns in accordance with a valid S corporation election,
and a valid QSST election is filed within two years of the
original due date. Rev. Proc. 94-23, I.R.B. 1994-10.
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. The taxpayer, an S
corporation, owned two commercial properties. The first
property was rented as offices, with the rent including
electricity and miscellaneous expenses. The taxpayer shared
the cost of office personnel and office space with a related
corporation. Maintenance of the building was supplied by an
individual contractor under the supervision of the taxpayer.
The second property contained warehouses with the related
corporation as the principal tenant. The rent included all
utilities, taxes and miscellaneous expenses. Maintenance of
the second property was done by a hired company under the
supervision of the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the rental
income from the properties was not passive investment
income under I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i). Ltr. Rul. 9404010,
Oct. 25, 1993.
The taxpayer, an S corporation, provided leasing
services to major companies. The taxpayer offered to
purchase equipment from the companies and leased the
equipment to customers. The companies found the potential
lessees but the taxpayer took title to the equipment, took all
the responsibility for the lease and provided all of the lease
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services, including the resale of the equipment at the end of
the lease. The taxpayer incurred substantial costs in
administering the leases, including office space, employee
wages, customer services and legal fees. The IRS ruled that
the rental income from the leases was not passive
investment income under I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i). Ltr.
Rul. 9404016 Oct. 27, 1993.
The taxpayer, an S corporation, owned and operated a
mobile home park and received rental income from leasing
the home sites. The taxpayer employed service personnel to
provide maintenance services for the lessees, including
appliance repairs. The taxpayer provided garbage collection
services and organized entertainment activities for the
tenants. The IRS ruled that the rental income from the leases
was not passive investment income under I.R.C. §
1362(d)(3)(D)(i).  Ltr. Rul. 9404019, Oct. 28, 1993.
The taxpayer, an S corporation, operated a vehicle
leasing business in which it purchased vehicles which it
leased to fleet customers. The taxpayer provided a wide
variety of services to the fleet customers, including repairs,
insurance, recordkeeping and unified billing of all costs.
The IRS ruled that the rental income from the leases was not
passive investment income under I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i).
Ltr. Rul. 9404026, Nov. 2, 1993.
SECOND CLASS OF STOCK.  The taxpayer was an S
corporation completely owned by over 20 related
shareholders. The three principal shareholders, two brothers
and their sister, wanted to redeem all of their shares without
harming the cash flow of the corporation and entered into a
multiple year redemption agreement under which the shares
were gradually redeemed by the corporation. The shares
were to be valued at the time of redemption by an
experienced independent appraiser. The redemptions would
not qualify for I.R.C. § 302 treatment but no taxable income
to the shareholders would be realized because the
corporation had sufficient amounts in the accumulated
adjustments account. The IRS ruled that the redemption
agreement did not create a second class of stock. Ltr. Rul.
9404020, Oct. 28, 1993.
TRUSTS. The taxpayer, an individual, owned shares of
an S corporation. The taxpayer created a trust with the S
corporation stock as corpus. Under the trust agreement, the
trustee was to distribute all income quarterly to the taxpayer
with distributions of principal only for the maintenance,
support, education and health of the taxpayer. The trust was
to terminate on a set date, when the stock was sold or upon
the dissolution of the corporation, whichever came first.
Upon termination of the trust, the corpus passed to the
taxpayer, by testamentary appointment by the taxpayer or to
the taxpayer’s lineal descendants. The IRS ruled that the
trust was a QSST. Ltr. Rul. 9404017, Oct. 27, 1993.
MORTGAGES
FORECLOSURE. After the debtors defaulted on their
loans from the plaintiff, the plaintiff sought foreclosure and
sale of the debtors’ farm. At the foreclosure sale, the
defendant asked the president of the plaintiff if the debtor
would get any of the proceeds if the sales price exceeded the
debt. The president stated that all of the proceeds would be
kept by the plaintiff. As a result of this, the debtors did not
bid on the farm and argued that the foreclosure should be set
aside because the sales price was too low. The trial court
had held that the irregularities of the sale did not justify
setting aside the sale because (1) the president’s statement
was inaccurate but unintentional, (2) the debtors’ reliance on
the statement was unreasonable and (3) the debtors did not
have sufficient funds to make a bid anyway. The appellate
court held that the trial court judgment was not erroneous.
Farm Credit Bank of Aroostook v. Sandstrom, 634 A.2d
961 (Me. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a].* The plaintiff was a bank which alleged that it
had a perfected security interest in all of the debtor’s cattle.
The defendant was a cattle buyer which had contracted with
the debtor to sell the debtor cattle which were to be resold to
the defendant after feeding. The plaintiff sued the defendant
for purchases of the cattle without payment to the plaintiff,
based on the alleged perfected security interest. The
transactions occurred in Mississippi, a state with a filing
system certified under the Federal Farm Products Rule. The
plaintiff did not present any evidence of a security
agreement and the financing statement identified the
collateral as all livestock owned or to be owned by the
debtor and located and leased by the debtor on a specific
farm. The cattle involved in the suit, however, were never
raised on that farm. The court held that although the
description of the specific farm made the financing
statement ambiguous, the description was sufficient to put
the defendant on notice that the cattle may have been
covered by the security interest; however, because no
security agreement had been presented, summary judgment
for the plaintiff was not possible since the financing
statement could not expand on the coverage of the security
agreement. The plaintiff also argued that because the
defendant had actual notice of the plaintiff’s claimed
security interest, the defendant was subject to the Federal
Farm Products Rule. The court held that the Federal Rule
first required a perfected security interest, which the
plaintiff had not conclusively proved. First Bank v.
Eastern Livestock Co., 837 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Miss.
1993).
PERFECTION-ALM § 13.01[4]. * The debtor was a
partnership which grew dry beans. In June 1990, the debtor
borrowed operating funds from the creditor and granted the
creditor a security interest in “all farm products of
whatsoever kind or nature, including all crops now growing
or hereafter to be grown.” The security agreement, however,
listed only five of 13 parcels of land on which the debtor
grew beans. A financing statement was properly filed but
included additional language extending the security  interest
to after-acquired farm products. The debtor’s bankruptcy
estate included beans and proceeds from beans from the
1989, 1991 and 1992 crops produced on all 13 parcels, with
the beans held in a third party processing warehouse which
cleaned  and  bagged  the  beans  and held the beans for sale.
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The debtor sought to avoid the security interest in the
beans, arguing that the beans were no longer farm products
but inventory not covered by the security agreement or that
the security interest did not attach to the eight parcels not
listed in the security agreement. The court held that because
the 1991 crop was growing when the security agreement
was executed, the security interest attached at that time and
the subsequent conversion of the beans to inventory did not
affect the attachment. The creditor argued that the 1989
crop, already in the possession of the processor warehouse
on the execution of the security agreement, was still a farm
product because the debtor had constructive possession of
the beans. The court refused to accept the concept of
constructive possession and held that the 1989 beans were
inventory because they were in the possession of a third
party and held for sale. The court also held that the 1991
beans grown on the eight parcels not described in the
security agreement were not covered by the security
interest. The court also held that the after-acquired clause in
the financing statement could function to expand the
coverage of the security agreement to reach after-acquired
farm products. In re Robert Bogetti & Sons, 162 B.R. 289
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
North American Rayon Corp. v. Comm’r, 12 F.3d
583 (6th Cir. 1993), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1992-610
(depreciation) see p. 29 supra.
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